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Executive Summary 
1. Exports of horticultural produce from Zimbabwe have increased dramatically in 
recent years and the production of high value horticultural export crops presents 
an unrivalled opportunity for many smallholder farmers. However smallholder 
farmers in Southern Africa have not been fully integrated into this success, partly 
because of the high risk often faced by those seeking to organise out-grower 
schemes. Many exporters are reluctant to work with smallholders because of 
diversion of produce to competing buyers and the failure of farmers to repay their 
creditors, sometimes known as "strategic default". 
2. This report describes a dialogue with the Zimbabwean horticultural industry, and 
particularly with the exporter Hortico, which together with Selbys, is one of two 
horticultural exporters sourcing substantial quantities from smallholders. The aim 
was to identify and test new approaches that would reduce the risks inherent in 
such schemes, thereby accelerating their development. 
3. Smallholder production of some horticultural crops offers decisive advantages to 
exporters in terms of quality, care of crops and availability oflabour. Smallholder 
plots may be dispersed over a range of soil types and microclimates offering some 
insurance against production risks. Smallholders may reap many benefits from 
contractual arrangements with commercial exporters who are a source of inputs 
and advice and, in the context of globalisation, are one of few opportunities for 
intensification and diversification of production. However, some observers 
advocate caution lest farmers enter into agreements that they do not understand or 
where the company fails to uphold its obligations. 
4. The procedures required of exporters by their main market, northern 
supermarkets, to demonstrate that they meet quality and food safety standards 
have served to erect another barrier to the inclusion of smallholders. Their 
dispersion and low level of education make it difficult to implement such 
procedures. 
5. The case ofHortico suggests that these barriers can be overcome if the exporter 
takes on the role of"benign dictator", setting up a strict supervisory system and 
assuming responsibility for rigid enforcement of standards. However, the system 
involves high overhead costs. The case of Selbys suggests there may be scope for 
reducing these costs by getting experienced groups of farmers to gradually assume 
more functions themselves. 
6. Hortico's approach is beneficial to smallholders and has potential to bring about a 
major shift from commercial to smallholder supply. Local monopsony has proved 
beneficial to the early development of the industry, by minimising strategic 
default and side-selling. In the long-term, a more competitive system is likely to 
come about as the example of innovating exporters causes more exporters to start 
working with smallholders. Public policy should encourage this trend. 
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7. Policy recommendations are directed at government, agribusiness, supermarkets 
and others, with a view to: 
• Accelerating the existing trend towards the involvement of smallholders 
• Helping smallholders maximise the benefits they derive from the industry. 
8. The most important measure is the "development of trust" and this depends 
principally on the exporter, which will need to provide strong support and 
supervision, and fulfil all its engagements. This role can also be reinforced by 
professional "facilitators", which may be trade associations, NGOs or individuals 
funded either by donors or by agribusiness itself. 
9. Donors and Governments might also accelerate the involvement of smallholders 
and increase their returns, through assistance with small-scale investments, for 
example in covered lined wells, sprinkler irrigation and toilet facilities, and by 
developing access roads. To a large degree such investments can be regarded as 
public goods and legitimate objects for public support. 
10. At the same time a set of quality guidelines should be developed to allow 
exporters sourcing from smallholders to meet European requirements and in 
particular meet the requirements of the UK Food Safety Act. Care should also be 
exercised to ensure that the application of ethical trade guidelines do not result in 
the exclusion of smallholders, on the grounds of their using family labour or other 
criteria. 
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1. Introduction 
Production of horticultural products for sale in export markets offers potential benefits 
to smallholder farmers. However recent experience of development projects and 
research (Stringfellow et al., 1997) and shows that due to widespread institutional 
failure, smallholder farmers in Southern Africa were not fully enjoying the fruits of 
market liberalisation, as regards the opportunities which had been opened up in the 
area of high value crops, particularly horticultural export crops. One of the root 
causes is the high risk often faced by those seeking to organise out-grower schemes, 
particularly diversion of produce to competing buyers and the failure of farmers to 
repay their creditors. In the current research project, the authors entered into a 
dialogue with the Zimbabwean horticultural industry, and particularly with the 
exporter Hortico, with a view to identifying and testing new approaches, which would 
reduce the risks inherent in such schemes, and thereby accelerating their development. 
This dialogue continued over a period of sixteen months, providing a range of 
insights on policy and practical issues affecting the development of export horticulture 
in Zimbabwe. Two workshops, one in Harare and one in London, allowed a range of 
stakeholders to discuss options for integrating smallholders into export horticulture on 
a wider scale and the support that would be required of different actors. The purpose 
of this paper is to make these insights more widely known for the benefit of those 
seeking to increase smallholder involvement in high-value export crops in Africa. 
2. Findings of previous literature 
The literature on contract farming provides a useful starting point for 
considering issues raised by the links, or absence of links, between smallholders and 
exporters in the horticultural industry. A generally accepted definition of contract 
farming is 'arrangements between a grower and a firm .. .in which non-transferrable 
contracts specify one or more conditions of marketing and production' (Little and 
Watts 1994: 4, following Glover and Kusterer 1990). The term outgrower scheme is 
also frequently used, but it is sometimes reserved for schemes with significant public 
sector input, e.g. where farmers are contracted to supply a state-owned processing mill 
(Glover and Kusterer, 1990). There is not one form of contract farming relationship, 
rather a 'constellation of institutional and production relations' (Little and Watts 
1994: 6), that is contracts may be negotiated, changed, and subsequently replaced by a 
different mode. 
In the academic literature, there have until recently been three broad schools of 
thought on contracting. The first we call the "mutual benefits" school, and this 
emphasises the advantages to both parties and the close interdependence between 
farmer and firm (for example Glover and Kusterer, 1990: 2). This school tends to 
focus on the techno-economic characteristics of horticulture. In direct contrast is the 
"food first" school, most active in the 1970s and 1980s, that alleged that commercial 
agriculture seriously damaged domestic food production (George, 1976, Dinham and 
Hines ,1983). However these arguments have been largely eclipsed by a pragmatic 
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recognition of the limitations of co-operative or State-led alternatives1• Finally there 
is the "globalisation" perspective as illustrated by Little and Watts (1994), who cast a 
fairly critical eye over commercial relations between smallholders and the commercial 
sector, but recognise them as a relatively permanent fixture in the context of 
globalising markets. 
There has been renewed interest in contract farming schemes mainly as a 
result ofliberalisation, with an emphasis on export-led growth. Donors and 
international finance institutions are particularly interested in expanding agricultural 
exports, particularly the so-called 'non-traditional exports' (Little and Dolan 1998).2 
On the demand side, a second reason for interest is the sourcing strategies of 
supermarkets, with UK supermarkets being amongst the leaders. There is increased 
demand for 'exotics' and, in fresh produce overall, supermarkets aim to offer a year-
round supply and are turning to African suppliers to meet their requirements (see 
section 4). 
Smallholders see a number of advantages in contract farming. Indeed, in some 
regions of Zimbabwe they have been keen to forge a relationship with the main 
exporters (see below). Commercial companies are seen as a source of inputs and 
advice, especially when state extension services and inputs supplies have disappeared. 
Moreover, as pointed out by Stringfellow (1995), links to commercial companies offer 
one of few opportunities for intensification and diversification of production. In some 
cases contract farming is associated with irrigation schemes, a major attraction where 
water shortage is one of the main constraints to expanded production. However, one 
must be mindful ofthe myriad of problems associated with contracts, particularly 
when smallholder farmers do not comprehend the liabilities involved. Crops may be 
rejected by the exporter, leaving the farmer with a crop for which there is no market 
locally, or quality and price procedures may be abused by companies to free 
themselves from contracts (Little and Dolan, 1998, p.14; Watts, 1994, p.63). Unsold 
crops leave farmers with debts to the company. 
There are many reasons why agribusiness should expand its sourcing from 
larger commercial farmers to small-scale farmers. Analysts emphasise the techno-
economic characteristics of many horticultural products which confer cost advantages 
to peasant farmers able to use the 'free' labour of household members, and sometimes 
criticise this as a form of 'self-exploitation' by peasants. They also note the benefits 
to business in smallholders bearing all production risks, an attractive option compared 
to the heavy sunk costs and risks in estate production. Others counter this apparent 
unfairness by noting that in return contracting transfers marketing risks to the 
company. The globalisation perspective recognises the potential for advantages on 
both sides, but points out that contracting with smallholders may be a temporary 
phenomenon in the development ofthe horticulture industry (Jaffee 1994, Watts 
1994). 
1 In Southern and Eastem-Africa, some State-led schemes of the 70s and 80s achieved major increases 
in smallholder maize yields (see Jayne and Jones, 1997), but we know of no successful schemes with 
high value crops. For a review of the performance of co-operatives in Africa, see Stringfellow et al., 
1997. 
2 Little and Dolan discuss the symbolic value of a commodity earning the label 'NTX'. Many 
traditional agricultural exports had earned bad reputation for inefficiency whereas the NTX are seen as 
vibrant and lucrative. 
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A central part of many contracting schemes is the provision to farmers of loans 
to buy inputs, or supply of the inputs package itself, in return for a commitment to 
market the outputs through the same company. These loans are recovered by 
deductions from the crop payment. Many companies have faced significant 
difficulties in recovering these loans or collecting crops: farmers simply do not repay 
or crops are sold to outside parties.3 
A key issue is the failure on the part of farmers to repay loans for inputs; and 
related to this side-selling to outside parties. This practice has been dubbed 'strategic 
default' in a study by Wye College that uses New Institutional Economics (NIE) 
theory (Poulton et al1998, Dorward et al1998). The study sees strategic default as a 
logical choice by farmers, which can be related to a long history of tactical resistance 
to outsiders by peasants, e.g. diversion of fertiliser to food crops, adulteration of 
produce (Watts 1994: 66). Farmers are fairly confident that few will repay, and 
seeing that past failure to repay has not been punished, draw the logical conclusion 
that they need not repay either. In Zimbabwe, strategic default on the part of 
smallholders has been a major deterrent to the further expansion of contracting with 
smallholders (see Section 5). 
The Wye study finds the problem to be much more serious in Sub-Saharan 
Africa than in Asia, because of different institutions governing access to land, low 
access to finance overall, particularly in rural areas, and recent experience of loans 
being treated as gifts (Poulton et all998, p.l6). By contrast, in the cases considered 
by Glover and Kusterer (1990), mostly in the Americas, default was a less common 
problem than insufficient quality or quantity of contracted crops. Nevertheless, the 
problem has been significant in Guatemala, notwithstanding this country's 
outstanding successes in smallholder export horticulture. Fox et al. (1994) report a 
number of agribusiness firms experiencing difficulties in enforcing contracts, usually 
because farmers would break them if spot prices at harvest exceeded contract prices4. 
For their part, some· farmers complained that buyers were applying higher standards 
when there was abundant supply. 
Other problems have affected dealings between agribusiness and smallholders, 
for example, transport and logistical problems, poor quality and technical growing 
capabilities (Chollet, 1997; Olivine,pers com). The experience of disastrous 
outgrower schemes involving smallholders, often led by donors or government, has 
particularly influenced some exporting companies. And fmally an important question 
with regard to the development impact of smallholder schemes is the return to the 
farmers. These issues will be considered in relation to the Zimbabwean experience 
later in the paper. 
In contrast to earlier works of the critical school, the Wye study provides a 
theoretical justification for out grower schemes, by asserting that a system of 
interlocking transactions, i.e. connections being made between input supply and 
3 Jaffee (1994) gives numerous examples of where this has occurred in the horticulture industry in 
Kenya. Cases were reported by a variety ofkey informants during field work in Zimbabwe in 1997/8. 
4 One fmn claimed that 40% of farmers were in arrears, several mentioned arrears in the 2-4% range, 
and others treated such cases as isolated problems. 
8 
output marketing, reduces problems of asymmetric information. 5 Interlocking is 
interpreted in terms ofNIE as a response to 'problems of information in environments 
characterised by high climatic and other risk, where smallholders do not generally 
have assets that can act as collateral to support borrowing' (ibid: p. 17). 
Many studies have advocated the use of smaller groups to present a united 
negotiating front to commercial companies (Watts et al, 1994; Chollet, 1997). The 
first phase ofthis present study questioned the sustainability of many types of farmer 
groups, but found that small groups which contracted directly with agribusiness stood 
the best chance of survival (Stringfellow et al, 1996). 
Communication between agribusiness and farmers is often a key problem and 
working through groups may help (see Porter and Philipps-Howard, 1997). In order 
to help solve misunderstandings, and more serious questions of exploitation, Ellman 
(1998) suggests that an NGO act as a facilitator in (the initial stages of) contractual 
relationships between smallholders and agribusiness. Basing his prescription on the 
experience of the Tanzanian NGO Faida, he suggests that an NGO can help deliver 
benefits to both parties through the provision of training in business and marketing to 
farmers, facilitating group formation and helping to ensure that farmers repay . 
Whilst the Faida model may be peculiar to Tanzania, there are many advantages to 
such a three-cornered arrangement, as will be discussed amongst the policy 
recommendations later. 
It is a truism that side selling and strategic default are likely to happen where 
there is open competition among buyers. Some companies have sought to ensure that 
they control the market for certain products in certain regions (Jaffee 1994), or 
government has prescribed regional monopsonies, as in the case of the Mozambican 
cotton industry. However, this considerably weakens the bargaining position of 
farmer. Participatory monitoring schemes involving representatives of growers and 
buyers may be an option here (Porter and Phillips-Howard, 1997, p 235). 
Contract farming offers both opportunities and hazards, since today's exotic 
product attracting premium prices may be tomorrow's common commodity, like 
banana and pineapple (Little and Dolan 1998, p. 4). The opportunity to farmers may 
be short term, and farmers therefore need to be able to use the experience to deal 
effectively with future changes in their external environment, and particularly in the 
market. 
3. Zimbabwe and horticultural exports 
In Zimbabwe, agriculture accounts for only 14.3% of the GDP, but it provides 
employment and livelihoods for 70% of the population, including most of the poorest 
inhabitants. The smallholder farming sector comprises of 1.2 million farming units in 
communal lands (ofwhich the population is 5.6 million), 56,800 resettlement farms 
( 426,000 population) and 8,500 small scale commercial farms. Despite this, these 
farms account for less than 15% of total marketed output. At the other end of the 
5 Examples include information sharing by traders, third party guarantors and referees, channelling 
loans through village leaders (Poulton et al, 1998, p.30). 
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scale, 4,000 large-scale farms comprise 33.4% of the land area and account for the 
remaining 85% of remaining marketed output. 
At a time when structural adjustment and market liberalisation led to a relative 
decline in staple grain crops (Jayne and Jones, 1997), export horticulture has become 
a major growth industry. The estimated value of such exports by air alone (including 
freight cost to destination) has risen from US$ 3.5 million in 1985/86 to US$ 110.8 
million in 1997/98, and is forecast to reach US$ 142.7 million in 1998/89 (values are 
in CIF terms). 
1988/89 
produce 
12% 
58% 
Figure 1. Zimbabwe's Horticultural Exports 
Source: HPC 
1998/99 flowers 
produce 
18% 
Zimbabwe's Horticultural Promotion Council (HPC) classifies horticultural 
exports as flowers, citrus fruits, and "produce", with the latter including exotic and 
out-of-season vegetables and fruit exported to Europe. In this paper, we are 
principally concerned with exports of"produce", as this includes those crops most 
likely to be cultivated by smallholders. Air-freighted exports of these crops have 
grown from US$1.2 million (396 tonnes) in 1985/86 to a forecast US$ 42.7 million 
(14,232 tonnes) for 1998/99. 
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The European Union accounts for approximately 90% of these exports by 
volume, the main market being the UK, which took 63% of all shipments between 
July and October 1998, followed by the Netherlands with 22%. There is no up-to-
date breakdown of produce exports by crop, and the latest available data dates from 
1995 and shows signs ofunder-recording. 
Table 1: Vegetable Exports From Zimbabwe By Crop - tonnes 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Mange-tout 2,029 1,387 1,159 1,309 
Sugar-snap peas 0 266 372 286 
Runner beans 0 211 77 211* 
Fine beans 354 86 40 73 
French beans 0 0 0 .. . 
Chillies 932 22 51 294 
Baby corn 12 25 27 88 
Sweet corn 115 95 50 13 
Courgettes 70 76 79 33 
Cherry tomatoes 128 144 46 28 
Potatoes 0 47 13 ... 
Sweet potatoes 0 0 0 ... 
Asparagus 1 4 12 4 
Onions 0 40 2 ... 
Other 78 38 94 ... 
Total 3,719 2,441 2,022 2,339 
* Probably includes some French beans 
Source: HPC, using data collated by Ministry of Agriculture from airway bills 
According to these figures, total exports in 1995 were 4,94 7 tonnes, but the 
true total is estimated to be around 7,500 tonnes, i.e. 75% oftotal produce exports of 
around 10,000 tonnes. 
Based on proprietary market research data, trade sources indicate that the 
world market for baby corn has been growing at an average of 15% per annum, with 
Europe accounting for the bulk of that growth. The United Kingdom is by far the 
largest market in Europe. Thailand is the world's largest exporter, but African 
exporters including Kenya, Zambia and Zimbabwe have made inroads over the last 
decade. 
· There are about 35 produce exporters in Zimbabwe, of which five can be 
considered major vegetable exporters: Mitchell and Mitchell, Gordons Country 
Fresh, Selbys, Interfresh and Hortico. Most of these are white-owned medium sized, 
limited liability companies developed from Zimbabwean family businesses. They 
supply the export trade mostly with produce from their own farms or from 
commercial farmers. Only three exporters (Hortico, Selbys and Shona Products) 
procure through smallholders. The volume from smallholders is quite small, in the 
region of 4-5% (pers. comm., HPC 1998). There are some indigenous entrepreneurs, 
for example Horti-Pack, which began by supplying Selbys but has managed to 
penetrate the South African market. 
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On the side of the exporting companies, there are stark differences of opinion 
about the wisdom of involving smallholders in production. Some have practically 
ignored smallholders, seeing smallholder schemes as a bad risk, lacking the necessary 
discipline and being unacceptable to their supermarket clients on account of problems 
with traceability. Three companies, Hortico, Selbys and Shona Products, procure a 
significant proportion of their supplies from smallholders, believing that for certain 
crops they have a comparative advantage over commercial farmers, regarding quality 
and cost of production. 
Table 2 shows net incomes and monetary costs for a variety of horticultural 
crops for smallholders and commercial farmers, prior to the major devaluation in 
1998. Smallholders are assumed only to bear costs of seed, fertiliser, agro-chemicals 
and packing materials, while family labour is assumed to have no monetary cost. 
Commercial growers, by contrast, are assumed to also pay for irrigation, fuel for 
mechanised cultivation and transport, and labour. Notably the crops which are most 
cultivated by smallholders are those where "commercial costs" are relatively high, 
e.g. baby corn (103%) and mange-tout (77%). 
Table 2: Net incomes for a variety of horticultural crops, Zim $ 
Crop Income smallholder net income commercial net income ratio of 
costs for farmer commercial commercial 
smallholders additional farmers costs to 
costs smallholder 
costs 
Carrots 100,000 18,400 81,600 11 ,340 70,260 0.62 
Mange- 60,000 15,720 44,280 12,110 32,170 0.77 
tout 
Cabbage 45,000 11,000 34,000 7,400 26,600 0.67 
Potatoes 50,000 22,000 28,000 8,200 19,800 0.37 
Onion 60,000 31,750 28,250 10,460 17,790 0.33 
Baby-corn 24,200 7,350 16,850 7,520 9,330 1.02 
2_ource: Horticultural Promotion Council and Farmers' Research Trust 
Due to falling prices on the international market, baby corn has become less 
attractive to commercial farmers, especially as tobacco prices have risen and 
cultivation ofbabycorn has fallen. Supplies have however been maintained by 
involving larger numbers of small farmers for whom the crop is still profitable at 
lower prices. 
Hortico and Selbys have pursued different approaches in involving small 
farmers. Hortico promotes small-scale production by individual farmers producing on 
micro-plots of several hundred square metres, using watering cans, and under intense 
supervision (see Box 1). By January 1999, 3,000 farmers were involved in the 
scheme, which Hortico considers to be on course for financial success. The recovery 
rate on advances to farmers was an impressive 98%, and this was attributed to the 
intense technical advice before and during production, allowing the farmers to obtain 
good yields. 
Selbys works closely with large irrigation projects, purchasing through three 
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groups established as part ofEU and GTZ technical assistance programmes based on 
resettled irrigation farms. Selbys provides seed and technical advice and collects 
produce from each centre. Supervision is not so close as with Hortico, and is based 
on leaflets which growers can use to grow crops and the group has to organise and 
schedule plantings. Two of the three groups are considered successful by Selbys, but 
there have been problems due to both lack of trust and loyalty between buyers and 
smallholders. 
Box 1: Hortico And Smallholders0 
The company exports a variety of horticultural produce including runner beans, babycom, 
sweetcom, mange-tout peas, sugar snaps, fine beans, baby carrots, salad onions and 
asparagus. However, only babycom (and to a lesser extent mange-tout) are sourced from 
smallholders. 98% of exports are shipped to Europe by refrigerated air transport, and 90% of 
this is sold to the UK, fresh, packed and labelled, primarily for supermarkets. Hortico has 
developed a system for sourcing from smallholders, derived from a contract-farming model 
pioneered in Kenya, and is implementing it through its subsidiary, Hortico Agrisystems. 
Agrisystems deals exclusively with small-scale growers in communal land areas within 
Mashonaland East, and is expected to cover the costs of its activities by taking a margin for 
services. In January 1997, the company was working with 40 smallholder growers but by 
October 1998, the number had grown to 1,700, and by January 1999, to 3,000. 
Agrisystems works through 19 regional centres, each supplied by 50-250 smallholders and 
employing on average four persons. A contract binds each farmer to selling his or her 
produce to Agrisystems, at a guaranteed price determined at the beginning of each crop cycle. 
The amount to be grown by each farmer is restricted so that sufficient care is taken of the 
crop, and to ensure that the farmer is not over-dependent upon the company and grows other 
crops for own consumption and local sales. Growers are advised to grow standardised plots 
of several hundred square feee. Agrisystems maintains strict control over production and 
provides all necessary technical support and inputs, except for labour and irrigation, and does 
all spraying. By closely controlling the growing process and providing extended supervision 
and agronomic assistance, the company ensures that the crop meets all the required hygiene 
and quality standards. 
A Hortico lorry collects graded produce every second day and transports it to the central 
pack-house. This enables a continuous supply of produce and reduces the risk of produce 
being sold elsewhere8. Grading of produce is undertaken locally in front ofthe farmer. On 
average 1-2% ofthe crop is rejected. The farmer is paid according to accepted produce even 
if a further rejection (approximately 20%) is made at the central pack-house. By October 
1998, Hortico was obtaining 2 tonnes ofbaby corn from smallholders per week, 50% of their 
total supplies, with average yields of one tonne per ha, though yields of over 2 tonnes per ha 
have been achieved. One hundred farmers had also started supplying mange-tout with 
favourable results. The company is planning to increase the number of smallholders to 4,600, 
production to 7 tonnes per week. 
6 More detail of the Hortico scheme is given in Appendix I. 
7 Initially the standard was 600 sq m for baby corn and 300 sq m for mange-tout 
8 Side trading is a well known problem of smallholder outgrower schemes. 
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A large part ofHortico's success in working with smallholders may be 
attributed to the high degree of control that it exercises over production and 
harvesting. Indeed, smallholder schemes appear to work best when major, established 
exporters take on the role of "benign dictator", organising smallholders and assuming 
responsibility for a rigid enforcement of standards. A similar approach is employed 
by Homegrown in Kenya. However in contrast to Hortico, Homegrown sources 
produce from smallholder farmers on plots of up to 50 hectares. More functions are 
carried out by the farmers themselves, but Homegrown still maintains very tight 
control with a view to supplying safe, good quality food to UK customers. Key 
measures include: strict record-keeping and traceability, training on correct pesticide 
measurement and application, inspection and monitoring of chemical stores, and the 
provision of grading facilities as well as a charcoal cooler to ensure temperature-
controlled conditions throughout the supply chain 
There have also been public sector and donor-funded initiatives in this field. 
On the whole they have proved unsuccessful, as is noted in more detail below. A 
major EU programme had proved unsustainable despite having operated in the 
country for 10 years between 1987 and 1997. Initial activities included free services 
to fanners for transport, ploughing and tillage as well as produce storage and grading. 
Many of the facilities and equipment from the project, including tractors are now 
unrepaired or have been leased to commercial companies (including Hortico which 
now runs the chilling and storage facility at Murewa). 
4. Demand from the supermarkets 
The leading market for horticultural produce from sub-Saharan Africa is the 
European supermarkets. They dominate European retail markets, and are becoming 
increasingly significant in fresh fruit and vegetables, a trend in which the UK is 
leading. In the UK, four supermarkets (Tesco, Sainsburys, ASDA and Safeway) 
account for 67% ofthe UK food market (Fresh Produce Journal, 15-5-1998). Food 
retailing is similarly concentrated in the Netherlands, but less dominant elsewhere in 
Europe (Cross, 1994, p. 141). 
UK supermarkets invariably buy exotic produce from UK-based importers. 
Increasingly they import directly, but this mainly applies to high volume products 
such as apples and potatoes (FPJ, 11-9-98). The wholesale trade is gradually loosing 
ground to supermarkets in fresh produce, and while important for certain ethnic lines, 
is only a minor player in exotic vegetables such as mange-tout, green beans and baby-
corn. 
The size of the UK retail market for fresh produce is expanding. According to 
a Key Note 1998 Market Report on fruit and vegetables (cited in FPJ, 29 May 1998), 
the market was valued at £6.06 billion in 1997, but was predicted to grow to £7.07 
billion by 2001. This growth in value reflects a general trend towards higher value 
niche markets, including exotic vegetables consumed by high-income consumers. 
According to Nicholas Saphir, spokesperson for the Fresh Produce Consortium, (FPJ 
29-5-98), there has been some decline in volume, but sales value has grown, led by 
new, more expensive products. Greater emphasis is being placed on "on higher 
quality, environmentally friendly products, new tastes and new colours". 
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Such products not only provide high growth potential but also allow the 
supermarkets to earn higher mark-ups than those obtainable on traditional lines. UK 
trade sources indicate typical retail mark-ups for fresh produce to be 25-50% on cost 
price, and around 33% for major items. However for exotics like baby-corn and 
mange-tout they are 50% or even higher. 
Supermarkets are in a strong position to obtain high mark-ups because of their 
extraordinary market power within food marketing chains, a subject much commented 
upon in the media during 1998, and discussed in an Office ofFair Trading research 
paper which points to the existence of the potential for regional monopoly. Indeed 
average net margins in UK supermarkets are roughly three times higher than in 
France, Germany and Spain (Dobson et al., 1998). Notwithstanding these 
observations, the interests ofUK supermarkets are largely complementary to those of 
the producing countries. High mark-ups ensure that exotics are well presented and 
given ample shelf-space. 
Supermarkets, particularly those in the UK, have increasingly focused upon 
the adoption ofHACCP procedures9 as their main tool for ensuring food safety. 
These emphasise the concept of traceability of product from the farmer to the final 
consumer. Records need to be maintained at each stage in the process, and potential 
safety issues addressed at points of critical importance. The high emphasis placed on 
traceability derives partly from the 1990 Food Safety Act, and partly from a zealous 
attitude among the supermarkets, seeking to develop their reputation in this field, 
especially in the context of food scares in the UK. 
A new scheme affecting only UK suppliers but indicative of the continuing 
pressure to improve quality standards, is the Assured Produce Scheme led by the 
National Union ofFarmers, launched in 1997. The scheme creates a single set of 
procedures along the supply chain as regards food safety, health and safety, energy 
use, the environment, pollution and specific crop management protocols. The purpose 
is to reassure consumers that food is safe but at the same time affordable and 
profitable to the producer. 
The adoption ofHACCP has important consequences for small producers. 
Although research suggests that smallholder food production is no less safe, there is 
considerable and to some degree understandable, scepticism among supermarkets 
about packers' ability to effectively control the quality of produce from large numbers 
of dispersed smallholders10. Meanwhile, the additional administrative and monitoring 
costs associated with HACCP dissuade many exporters from considering smallholder 
out-grower schemes. Over all, phytosanitary measures and quality standards are 
potentially high barriers to entry for new entrants to the export trade, and for 
smallholder suppliers, as are the requirements for high cosmetic appearance 
Since a well publicised Christian Aid report criticising supermarkets for 
9 Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points. 
10 The concern was summed up by one observer who asked: "Would you wish to eat vegetables grown 
on a plot watered by dirty watering can from a shallow pond adjacent to which cattle are penned every 
night and around which children defecate on their way to the field to help pick the corn without 
washing their hands?". 
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turning a blind eye to the welfare of workers overseas producing goods for their 
shelves, the issue of social justice has now come to the fore (Christian Aid, 1997). In 
the last year the major retailers have been working towards codes of practice for 
suppliers on ethical trading, with particular attention to social welfare and working 
conditions. Discussion is still taking place on appropriate criteria for the different 
types of product, and methods of auditing. 11 
From the above discussion, it can be seen that UK demand is being driven by 
competition between an oligopsony of supermarket chains, competition which focuses 
largely on non-price factors. They seek to position themselves up-market, cultivating 
an irreproachable image for quality, to broaden their product range and develop fast-
growing high margin lines (such as exotic vegetables) making a higher than normal 
contribution to corporate profit. They also wish to project an image as ethical traders, 
but so far the inclusion or exclusion of smallholders from their supply chains has not 
figured as an ethical issue within codes of conduct. Indeed due to their concerns over 
quality, they are often discouraging their suppliers from working with smallholders. 
The main buyers have adopted rigid systems, dubbed "painting by numbers" 
(Malins, 1999) which call for procedures and records from all producers regardless of 
their circumstances. This approach has created unnecessary hurdles for smallholders, 
especially where requirements are inappropriate and in some cases risible, some were 
likened to "showing a dry-cleaning ticket to prove that your work clothes were clean". 
5. Local issues relating to development of outgrower schemes in 
Zimbabwe 
Strategic default and side-selling 
This is the major local issue for the development of outgrower schemes in 
Zimbabwe. Smallholders are able to access small loans at preferential credit rates in 
order to purchase inputs, through a state guarantee scheme managed by the 
Agricultural Finance Company (AFC). Default on these loans is high, currently 
affecting more than 35% of borrowers (pers. comm., AFC), and this and other project-
related experiences discussed in Stringfellow and McKone (1996) suggest that the 
culture of strategic default is well established. 
Other examples abound. The HPC (pers. comm.) reported that only 22.5% of 
total loans for growing paprika were repaid. There was also a less than 20% 
repayment rate on loans for maize production on outgrower programmes sponsored by 
GTZ, mainly because of side-selling (pers. comm., Price Waterhouse Ltd.). 
Efforts are being made to reduce default. COTPRO, the former parastatal in 
the cotton industry, has been particularly successful in this regard, by de-listing 
defaulting groups, and rewarding better groups by advising them how to increase 
overall yields and incomes, including growing other crops to complement production 
11 A framework for the harmonisation of producer codes for horticulture and floriculture in Kenya, 
Zimbabwe, Zambia, Uganda and Tanzania was agreed at a meeting in Harare, 10 and 11th September 
1998. 
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and comparing their yields to those of other groups. One cotton buyer in Zimbabwe 
offers credit (repayable after harvest) at 10% below the official bank rate on the 
assumption of secured supply, assuming that the final sales price is above that ofthe 
input cost. However, very few commercial companies are willing to legally enforce 
their contractual rights over a smallholder in the courts. Most companies learn from 
experience, reluctantly accepting a relatively high initial default and gradually 
building up a list of reliable suppliers, either as individuals or groups. 
The authors organised a workshop to discuss the organisation of outgrower 
schemes, involving key representatives of agribusiness, NGOs, farmer support 
organisations and a bank (see Appendix 2). Participants highlighted the high risks in 
setting up out-grower schemes, suggesting that they were unviable for some 
"commodity" type products, e.g. cotton and paprika, and difficult for other crops. 
They also indicated that financial institutions do not understand the potential or needs 
of outgrower schemes. 
Poor transport and logistics 
Organising outgrower schemes is made difficult by the poor accessibility of 
the producing areas and the perishability of many horticultural crops. 
Smallholders lack local cold storage facilities, and where public transport is 
available it is often unreliable. Not surprisingly, exporters do not to encourage 
smallholders to deliver directly to their packhouses, but collect the produce 
themselves or delegate this responsibility to an intermediary. Due to lack of chilled 
vehicles, fresh vegetables are generally sourced from less than 100 km from the 
packhouse. The high cost of collecting small, dispersed volumes from smallholders 
clearly lowers the price that exporters can pay the farmers. Such costs can be reduced 
by public investments in infrastructure (roads, telecommunications), and small-scale 
chilling devices may be used to preserve the shelf life of vegetables. 
Poor Quality & technical growing capabilities 
There are some clear quality and care advantages to buying from smallholders 
over commercial farmers. For example, smallholders protect crops more effectively 
as they take the time to pick off caterpillars and other pests. The output of larger 
plantations lacks consistency, as workers are not motivated in same way. Production 
on many small plots small plots enhances continuity of supply through geographically 
dispersed microclimates, poses fewer problems of disease, and allows for inter-
cropping, which increases protection against wind damage. Hortico 's smallholders 
are also growing in frost-free areas and have fewer costs compared to commercial 
farmers, partly because of the use of unpaid family labour, see below. 
Despite their comparative advantage with horticultural crops requiring high 
labour inputs and careful attention, smallholders are unfamiliar with many export 
crops and have to overcome a number of quality and technical barriers resulting from 
the importing countries requirements and procedures. Lack of experience is 
compounded in many areas by the dwindling extension services offered by 
Government. Hortico Agrisystems and Selbys' experience is that these problems can 
be overcome. Agrisystems has achieved this over two years, by providing intensive 
17 
supervision, advice and spraying services, and running decentralised collection 
centres (see Box 1 above). 
Smallholders have enjoyed particular success with babycorn, which has the 
following advantages over other crops: (a) growing conditions are similar to the 
traditional maize crop; (b) it requires few chemical inputs, given that seeds are pre-
treated, and; (c) there is a fair margin for picking error, due to relatively slow growth 
near harvest (notwithstanding strict length and size specification). The introduction of 
mange-tout peas has been slower since insufficient quantities of Class A crop is 
produced for either the grower or the exporter to earn satisfactory returns. 
Considerable additional technical work is therefore required to ensure a satisfactory 
product. Hortico's progress so far indicates that these efforts are gradually paying off. 
Irrigation problems 
Rainfed production is generally unacceptable for most export horticulture. 
However, Zimbabwe, as many other African countries, suffers from the effects of 
highly variable rainfall. Water shortage is smallholders' main constraint to 
horticultural production, and in a survey in Mashonaland East it was cited by more 
than half of respondents (Turner and Chivinge, 1998, p.48). Boreholes and pump-fed 
irrigation schemes provide opportunities but commonly suffer from mechanical 
breakdown. Hence whilst there are theoretical volume advantages in working with 
the large irrigation schemes, some produce exporters prefer working with the smaller 
gravity-fed irrigation schemes. Furthermore smallholders serviced through boreholes 
are often dispersed. 
There is widespread agreement amongst development practitioners and 
commercial enterprises in Zimbabwe that many government and donor-led outgrower 
schemes have been disastrous. An example, the Negomo irrigation scheme fmanced 
through the German aid programme illustrates some typical problems (Box 2). 
Box 2: The Negomo Dam 
The Negomo dam was built in 1995 and an on-going project with the aim of developing a 
model which could be replicated on other irrigation schemes involving resettled communal 
farmers began in 1996. 
Nearly three hundred farmers, each with 1.2 hectares, are involved and are provided with 
extension advice, training and equipment (including three tractors an office block, a housing 
complex, a fertiliser and chemical store, a garage, a produce cooling room and a training 
facility, with plans for a packhouse in the future). The farmers are grouped into twelve 
farmer committees, the chairs of which Farmers have also been provided with 0.7 hectares 
each of citrus on a four year loan. Other supplied crops include passion fruits. Initially 
services were provided free but with the intention that charges would be gradually 
introduced. 
However, the organisers anticipate problems in introducing charges and expect few of the 
loans to be repaid and the project staff have little idea at the present time as to who will own 
the equipment and facilities at the end ofthe project, whenever that may be. 
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Part of the problem is that the management of irrigation schemes tends to be 
inflexible, and is therefore not reliable or responsive enough to deal with the needs of 
marketing horticultural crops. With formal irrigation schemes it is necessary to deal 
with smallholders through existing committee structures, which one commentator 
likened to "a large estate run by a committee rather than by an individual manager". 
It proves difficult to reward individual farmers for their performance, and vital 
decisions (for example to fix a broken pump) are sometimes much delayed. In this 
regard it is interesting to note that Hortico has chosen to concentrate the bulk of its 
efforts on smallholders outside irrigation schemes. In doing this the company 
penalises itself in terms of the small volume of output that each farmer supplies, and 
consequently the high supervisory overheads involved, but it gains through much 
better control over the timeliness and quality of production. 
The marketing dimension of many schemes has been problematic, or even an 
after-thought. More success has been encountered with smaller scale irrigation 
schemes, particularly those using low-technology trickle irrigation. A more 
successful example of an irrigation scheme is the Howard irrigation scheme funded by 
Danida in 1990. This was a small-scale scheme involving 18 farmers each with one 
hectare. Half the money for the installation of pumps was paid for by the farmers 
themselves, and direct labour was also provided by the farmers. The farmers were 
provided with extension advice and they secured a market with a local boarding 
school. 
Returns to farmers 
Farmers' interest in export markets is stimulated by the generally higher prices 
paid, and the fact that international markets are less subject to periodical gluts which 
can drive down prices to uneconomical levels. Table 2 (see section 3) provides 
information on returns to alternative crops. It should be noted exotic vegetables can 
be cultivated up to three times a year, and can potentially provide a regular and 
dependable source ofhousehold income. 
Due to a series of intervening costs and mark-ups, farmers only derive a small 
percentage of the final price paid by consumers in UK supermarkets; Harris-Pascal et 
al. (1998) indicate that commercial growers of mange-tout peas get around 11.9% 
(see Table 3). The supermarket gets by far the largest share (45.9%), but this includes 
13.5% for losses from llllsold stock. There are also stock losses at the importer level. 
If the consumer spend is discounted by the value of such losses at both the importer 
and supermarket level, then the grower can be seen to receive significantly more than 
11.9%. 
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TABLE 3: Cost Structure of African fresh fruit and vegetable exports to the UK 
One tonne export lot of mangetout from Export of fresh 
Zimbabwe vegetables form 
Kenya 
Stage Price per tonne (£) I % of final price % of final price 
Producer 630 11.9 
Exporter 291 5.5 
Packaging 274 5.2 
Air freight and 
handling 1,036 19.6 
TOTAL Cl F from 
Africa 2,230 42.2 
Importer charges 624 11.8 
and commission 
Supermarket 
Stockout 714 13.5 
Other costs 285 5.4 
Mark-up 1,487 27.0 
Total price 5,281 100 
From Harris-Pascal et al (1998, p.11) 
Hortico pays Hortico Agrisystems prices similar to those which it pays 
commercial farmers who deliver directly to its packing plants. The smallholders 
supplying Agrisystems inevitably get a smaller share of the final consumer price than 
do commercial farmers, due to the cost of supervisory and procurement systems 
which Agrisystems has established 12• Based on information from trade sources, we 
estimate that in order to break even a company like Hortico Agrisystems may have to 
pay its smallholder suppliers less than 30% ofthe price per kg paid to commercial 
farmers who deliver directly to the packing plant. The difference is mainly accounted 
by the intervening costs, including general and administrative expenses, transport and 
capital costs (including interest and depreciation). 
This example graphically illustrates why other companies have been slow to 
follow Hortico's example of working with smallholders working on micro-plots. It 
also shows that it is important to fmd ways of increasing smallholder revenue. How 
can this be achieved? 
Cost saving probably offers the best way of improving returns to smallholders. 
In particular Hortico might gradually delegate to smallholders some of the local 
supervisory and management functions, much as cotton companies in Francophone 
Africa have delegated to Village Associations13. Given the quality and traceability 
12 The share received by smallholders has also varied due to the effect of frequent devaluation of the 
Zimbabwe dollar. 
13 Presently the direct cost of the baby corn to Agrisystems, including inputs and transport, is about 
44% of the sale price to the parent company, Hortico. There may be scope for reducing the indirect 
cost burden. 
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14.1 
13.1 
21.2 
48.4 
6.1 
45.5 
100 
! 
issues involved, this will be much more difficult with export horticulture. 
Nonetheless, it is possible to envisage a situation where small and experienced groups 
of farmers are accredited to carry out certain functions for themselves. Unlike the 
typically lOO-strong Village Associations ofFrancophone countries, the groups would 
need to be small (around 10 members) and have a high level of internal coherence, 
like some of the more successful farmers' groups identified in our earlier research 
(Stringfellow et al., 1997). To institute such arrangements, HACCP systems need to 
be implemented with flexibility and imagination; this in turn depends upon the 
supermarkets' willingness to sanction innovative approaches to quality management, 
which are well adapted to smallholder requirements. 
In Kenya, the exporters' trade association, Fresh Produce Exporters' 
Association of Kenya (FPEAK), is currently promoting the organisation of primary 
level groups of 15 to 20 farmers, and this might serve as a model for Zimbabwe. The 
groups seek to turn their membership into a single economic unit (like a commercial 
farm), with whom the exporter can deal directly. They currently assist their members 
with inputs, integrated crop management systems, hygiene, pesticide uses and record 
keeping. In the future they might take on additional financing and marketing 
functions. 
Donors might also contribute to increasing returns to smallholders through 
assistance with small-scale investments, for example in water supplies, sprinkler 
irrigation and toilet facilities. Relatively small investments at this level may do much 
to increase smallholders' competitive position vis a vis commercial farmers, and make 
it easier for the exporter to control water quality in line with trade requirements. Such 
support should only be provided where the farmer has a profitable market outlet 
allowing for maintenance and replacement of the assets concerned. 
Selbys treats its smallholder irrigation scheme suppliers in the same way as 
commercial farms and pays them on the same basis. This reflects the fact that Selbys 
is working with large groups of farmers and not with individuals, provides less 
supervision, and therefore bears a much lower level of overheads per kilo of 
vegetables procured. Selbys claims that its costs are nonetheless higher than with 
commercial farms, and that they are consequently cross-subsidising smallholders at 
the expense ofthe commercial farms. 
A particular problem affecting farmers' returns from export horticulture is that 
companies generally wish to pay them by cheque. Even in areas where there are 
banks, few farmers have bank accounts, and they often find they need to cash their 
cheques at a discount with local traders (Chollet, 1997). 
6. The wider political context 
The wider political context creates problems and challenges for the organisation of 
successful export horticulture, at three different levels: 
• at the local level, there is often limited trust between agribusiness and farmers, or 
their representatives, fuelling problems of strategic default and side-selling; 
• at the level of national politics, the fact that almost all agri-businesses are white-
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owned makes them a potential target for criticism, and where they have an 
interface with the black majority, they have a high public profile; 
• both domestically and internationally, the politics of"ethical trade" creates a 
dilemma facing exporters who wish to include smallholders and then face 
accusations of encouraging poor working conditions etc. 
Current ethical codes of conduct such as those promoted by COLEACP do not 
specifically address small holder issues as they are currently focused on working 
conditions on plantations as opposed to the relationships between contracted 
smallholders and agribusiness. This latter area tends to be the concern of"fair trade" 
practitioners. In the highly charged ethical arena companies such as Hortico may risk 
the accusations of condoning poor working conditions on smallholder farms. 
Moreover, the level of control exercised by Hortico has been criticised for failing to 
empower smallholders and as such, it did not deserve any public encouragement or 
support (Carlton 1997; Griffith, 1997). 
Contrary to this perception, the authors find that Hortico 's scheme is unique in 
targeting smallholders outside irrigation schemes, and involving them in high value 
export horticulture. While there may be ways of improving the system from the 
smallholder perspective, the scheme is bringing considerable benefits to these 
farmers. The scheme is clearly highly controlled by Hortico itself and provides very 
limited scope for the smallholders to take independent initiative, but we see this as a 
necessary response to the demand of supermarkets, pressures for quality and 
traceability, and problems of strategic default and side-selling. As indicated below , 
there may be scope to gradually increase farmer empowerment in ways that take 
account of these pressures. 
Carlton and Griffith went on to suggest an alternative strategy, whereby donors 
would support the development of an alternative co-operatively organised scheme, 
targeting the same European markets as well as "fair trade" outlets. Such a strategy is 
unlikely to work, given the poor record of large co-operative ventures in Africa (see 
earlier research reported by Stringfellow et al., 1997), and because of difficulty in 
gaining acceptance in European market, particularly in the UK., given the stringent 
quality requirements, and supermarkets' and importers' tendency to work with trusted 
suppliers. 
7. Policy conclusions 
The main conclusion of this report is that Zimbabwe's current approach to the 
development of export horticulture is broadly beneficial to smallholders. While the 
percentage of produce they currently supply is very small, the trend is upwards and 
there are already three agribusiness firms committed to their involvement. One firm 
(Hortico) is pioneering an innovative approach which, if successful, can bring about a 
major shift from commercial to smallholder supply. This is particularly opportune in 
view of Government's policy of redistributing land in favour of communal farmers, 
since ready-made markets are needed to ensure that such land can be fully utilised. 
We have discussed questions of equity, and conclude that the main issue in the 
immediate future is the degree to which smallholders are involved in the sub-sector, 
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that is to say the more smallholders are involved the greater the social welfare which 
the activity will generate. In the longer term, local monopsony power of 
agribusinesses may be a concern. Monopsony power has proved beneficial to the 
early development of the industry, by minimising strategic default and side-selling. 
However, in view of the unequal bargaining power of the parties involved, a more 
competitive system is probably desirable in the long-term. This may come about if 
and when other agribusiness - particularly the three large players currently tied to 
commercial sources of supply - copy the successful innovators, giving some 
smallholders the opportunity of switching allegiance. 
In relation to this panorama, public policy should seek to: 
• accelerate the existing trend towards the involvement of smallholders 
• help smallholders maximise the benefits they derive from the industry 
These are now discussed in turn. 
Accelerating smallholder involvement 
With regard to the first objective, steps are needed to reduce the risks faced by 
agribusiness. The Harare workshop identified the following steps: 
(a) develop trust between smallholders and commercial companies; 
(b) tax incentives to encourage out-grower schemes; 
(c) more innovative financing schemes, involving risk-sharing between farmers, 
banks and commercial companies, and; 
(d) possibly, subsidised loans, but only on the basis of clear and open guidelines. 
We believe that "development of trust" is the most important measure, and this 
depends principally on the agribusiness, which will need to provide strong support 
and supervision, and fulfil all its engagements. This role can be reinforced by NGOs 
trade associations, individuals or other "facilitators", funded either by donors or by 
the agribusiness itself. One reason for distrust is that smallholders do not believe they 
are getting a fair share of the price the agribusiness gets on international markets, or 
that they do not understand why prices are suddenly lowered. An example of how 
this might possibly be dealt with comes from Tanzania, where the NGO Faida has 
been contracted to design formulae establishing a transparent link between the two 
prices (Ellman, 1998). For similar reasons, Faida has arbitrated over disputes between 
the contracting parties. 
A further finding of the Harare workshop was that financial institutions "do 
not understand the potential or needs of out-grower schemes". Successful examples 
in the horticultural sector will do much to demonstrate their potential, but this can be 
backed up by publicly-funded workshops and training exercises for bank staff. The 
workshop also indicated that farmers found it difficult to manage their own money, 
and that this was a powerful deterrent to banks in funding such schemes. This 
suggests the need for educational and the promotion of savings, which might be 
performed by NGOs or other parties. 
The UK supermarkets also have a key role to play in maximising smallholder 
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involvement. Two steps are suggested: firstly to introduce into the ethical trade 
criteria currently planned by supermarkets a judgement as to whether reasonable 
effort has been taken to include smallholder farmers in the supply chain; secondly, by 
investing resources in the search for ways to adapt HACCP and other codes of 
conduct to the realities of smallholder agriculture. This does not mean that standards 
should be relaxed - only that they should be applied in ways that are cost-effective and 
manageable for smallholders. A set of quality guidelines should be developed to 
allow exporters sourcing from smallholders to meet European requirements and in 
particular meet the requirements of the UK 1990 Food Safety Act. Care should also 
be exercised to ensure that the application ethical trade guidelines do not result in the 
exclusion of smallholders, on the grounds of their using family labour or other 
criteria. 
Maximising smallholder benefits 
This fundamentally involves empowering farmers to take full advantage of the new 
market opportunities. This includes: 
• basic education in business and marketing, covering topics such as: different crop 
opportunities, alternative marketing chains, product life-cycles, negotiation, 
appraisal simple investment opportunities, and the management of funds and 
savmgs; 
• assistance with the introduction of new production and irrigation techniques; 
• education in good hygiene practice; 
• assistance in acquiring the necessary hardware and infrastructure (e.g. covered 
lined wells, sprinkler irrigation systems, toilets and roads) 
• organisational skills, principally focused on pragmatic co-operation among small 
groups of people who need to work together on a day-to-day basis, or liase with 
agribusiness partners. As indicated earlier, small groups directly engaged in 
production are likely to be more acceptable partners than committees representing 
large groups. 
As the farmers' organisational capabilities develop, they can start comparing the 
offers of different agribusiness and contract accordingly on a seasonal or annual basis. 
This is not an invitation to strategic default, which as we saw earlier, is a major 
disincentive to agribusiness involving smallholders. The strength and the viability of 
the organisation can be measured by its ability to fulfil contracts. Strong grass roots 
organisations can also start exploring opportunities for taking on functions previously 
performed by the agribusiness. 
Exporters may provide some assistance along the lines listed above, with a view to 
cementing stable long-term relationships with their suppliers. However, it should be 
noted that the assistance involves a large element of "public good", i.e. it benefits the 
society in general and not just the exporter. There is therefore a good case for the 
public sector support, either directly or through intermediaries - NGOs, trade 
associations or individuals who may be contracted to facilitate the development of 
outgrower relationships. 
A suitable NGO will be one with an entrepreneurial outlook, which has staff 
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trained in marketing and finance, and which seeks to "work its way out of the job". 
The importance of the later was highlighted at the Harare workshop. NGOs should 
avoid any direct commercial involvement, and should in no way become 
intermediaries between agribusiness and fanners. Commercial activities are best 
carried out by commercial companies. Concerns were expressed lest NGOs move 
seamlessly into the role that government had in the promotion of agricultural trade, 
i.e. become too "hands-on". This admonition is pertinent in view of this research 
team's earlier findings about earlier donor experience in supporting the development 
of fanner co-operation. Due to the pressures to disburse funds and achieve numerical 
targets, much of this support had been counterproductive and damaging to the 
prospects for lasting co-operation (Stringfellow et al., 1997). 
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Appendix 1 
Case study- Hortico Produce - Zimbabwe. 
By John Millns, Plunkett Foundation 
Summary 
Since 1989 horticultural exports from Zimbabwe primarily to western Europe 
have increased dramatically and on average by 25% per year. Since registration in 
1985 Hortico produce has become one of the four largest exporters offresh vegetable 
produce from the country. 
In order to secure a consistent supply of export quality produce the company 
initiated an innovative scheme in December 1996 aimed at obtaining produce 
supplies from communal farmers on land plots of less than 600m2. 
The initial pilot crop for the scheme was babycorn and within 2 years 1, 700 
smallholder farmers were involved with the scheme, accounting for 50% of babycorn 
supplies to the company equal to 102 tonnes of produce per annum. More than 
1,500,000 $Zim was paid to communal farmers by the company in 1998. The company 
now operate 17 collection points employing and the scheme employs 70 persons full 
time in communal areas. 
In order to build upon the initial success the company have ambitious plans to 
more than double the numbers of smallholder suppliers, build upon and improve the 
post harvest infrastructure and expand the project into other areas and crops. 
Background. 
Hortico Produce is a company registered in Zimbabwe. It is situated 45 
kilometres north east ofthe capital Harare. Hortico began operation in 1985 to export 
horticultural produce primarily to European markets. The company export a variety of 
horticultural produce including runner beans, babycom, sweetcom, mangetout peas, 
sugar snaps, fine beans, baby carrots, salad onions and asparagus. 
Table 1 shows the annual growth of horticultural exports from the company, 
which is now the fourth largest horticultural exporter from Zimbabwe. 
Table 1 - Hortico exports. 
1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 
Exports- value (Z$ OOO's).'" 23 3,484 15,075 31,919 51,228 
Percentage increase (3 15,048% 333% 112% 60% 
years) 
Export- volume (tonnes). 11 749 1,735 1,093 1,095 
98% of exports are sold to Europe on a daily basis by refrigerated air transport. 
90% of produce is sold to the UK, fresh, packed and labelled primarily for 
supermarkets. 
14 1 GBP = 45 $Zim. 
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Hortico Produce was supplied solely from their own farms and other 
commercial growers until December 1996. At this time the company decided to 
expand its suppliers to include small scale growers primarily in communal1516areas 
north of Harare. 
The Hortico Produce - small scale farmer outgrower scheme. 
In January 1997 Hortico Produce established a subsidiary, Hortico 
Agrisystems with the objective of dealing exclusively with small scale growers in 
communal land areas within the region ofMashonaland East. The scheme was 
modelled on successful contract farming schemes in Kenya. Within the first year the 
company were working with 700 smallholder growers and by November 1998 a total 
of1,700. 
Farmers have been selected on the basis of a 10 point checklist including 
access to reliable water supply, their experience of growing vegetables, the correct 
soil fertility and their distance from the main Hortico Produce packhouse as well as 
their own houses. A spread of farmers across a number of areas also lessens the 
possibility of disease spread. 
Contracts are drawn up between Hortico Agrisystems and each individual 
grower. Selling prices are agreed with the grower prior to each season and the 
company guarantees a minimum price to enable growers to draw up budgets for the 
growing season. The fanners are obliged to sell their produce to Hortico Agrisystems 
who sell on to the parent company after deducting costs for their activities. Growers 
are paid in cash against crop receipts within 14 days of crop delivery to the collection 
point. 
Each grower is advised to grow to a standardised plot size (initially 600 m2 for 
babycom and 300m2 for mangetout peas), requiring no more than two hours per day 
on average to cultivate and harvest. This allowed growers to allocate proper time to 
growing the crop without a major interference in their other activities. The growers 
are advised to grow other crops for their own consumption and for local sales. 
The standard plot size also ensures that a standard package of inputs (a plot 
kit) can be provided to the grower at the beginning of each growing cycle. Hortico 
Agrisystems provides a plot kit valued Z$220 to each grower. Hortico Agrisystems 
provides all the inputs required to grow the crop except for labour and irrigation. This 
ensures that the crop meets all the required hygiene and quality standards, by closely 
controlling the growing process and through providing extended supervision and 
agronomic assistance. Small scale growers are able to acquire the technical know how 
with which to grow export quality products. 
Hortico Agrisystems support includes: 
• providing spraying services (Hortico Agrisystems is not prepared to allow growers 
to apply chemicals themselves on the crops). 
15 The smallholder farming sector in Zimbabwe comprises of 1.2 million farming units in communal 
lands ( 5.6 million persons) including many of the poorest inhabitants. 
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• agronomic advice from field clerks. 
• providing collection centres within the proximity of groups of farmers. 
Hortico Agrisystems provides seeds, chemicals and fertilisers on credit, the cost of 
which is deducted from payments made to growers for their crop, with a 15% service 
charge added. The average repayment rate for this credit was 98% in 1998. 
A transport lorry provided by Hortico collects graded produce every second day 
and transports it to the central packhouse. This enables a continuous supply of 
produce and reduces the risk ofproduce being sold elsewhere17. Grading of produce is 
undertaken locally in front ofthe farmer. On average 1-2% ofthe crop is rejected 
initially. The farmer is paid according to accepted produce even if a further rejection 
(approximately 20%) is made at the central packhouse. 
The organisational structure for the operation of the scheme primarily focuses upon 
collection points. By November 1998 the company was managing 17 collection points 
north east ofHarare, each with between 50- 200 farmers and had hired an additional 
cooling and collection point for produce delivered from smallholder growers at 
Murewa, 40 kms outside ofHarare. 
On average each centre employs four persons (Figure 1 ). These staff include: 
• A field clerk providing crop management advice and informal training of growers 
on land preparation, planting, cultivation, fertiliser application and harvesting. 
• A sprayer applying pesticides to the crops of individual growers. 
• A grader to sort crops delivered to the centre according to size and quality 
specifications. 
• An accounting clerk recording acceptable crop and grower receipts which are 
redeemable for cash as well as other paperwork duties. 
Staff at the collection points are paid a basic wage plus bonuses according to the 
amounts of produce delivered. Staff are recruited locally and at village level. 
There is a well developed recording system at each centre which records, the size 
of each plot, the issuing of inputs with quantities and dates, the dates of plantings and 
harvests, the dates and types of applications and the amount of crop delivered and 
accepted each day. 
A reconciliation sheet is also issued when farmers are paid which includes details 
of produce delivered, input charges and net incomes for farmers. This system enables 
Hortico Agrisystems to compare performances between farmers as well as to trace 
product to collection centres and to particular picking dates. 
The babycorn market 
The initial pilot crop for the Hortico small scale outgrower scheme was baby 
corn. Between 1992-1997 the world market for baby corn experienced an average 
growth of 15% per annum .. Europe accounted for the bulk of that growth. Active 
17 Side trading is a well known problem of smallholder outgrower schemes. 
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markets also existed in North America and the Middle East. During this time Thailand 
was the largest exporter in the W odd. Increasingly however Kenyan, Zambian and 
Zimbabwean exporters began to make inroads into the market. 
90% of exports are to supermarkets, 5% to food caterers, 3% to wholesalers 
and manufacturers of ready made meals and 2% to local supermarkets and individual 
customers. 
Babycom is a management and labour intensive crop requiring detailed 
monitoring. It requires harvesting at exactly the correct time in order to ensure the 
correct size and quality. As a result labour comprises of35% of the total production 
cost. Irrigation comprises of a further 25%. 
Babycom therefore provided a useful opportunity for small scale production, 
particularly as labour and irrigation costs were significantly reduced, due to manual 
irrigation. Communal land areas within Mashonaland East are largely in frost free 
areas, enabling a longer growing season to be possible. Communal farmers also have 
experience of growing a similar and more traditional crop, maize and the attention to 
detail provided by small scale growers soon proved that a high quality product could 
be grown. 
Plantings are scheduled by the company for every six weeks with selected 
groups of growers in order to maintain a continuity of supply, with each grower 
expected to grow a plot size equivalent to 15 rows of corn (600m2). By November 
1998 the company reported obtaining 2 tonnes ofbabycom per week from 
smallholder growers, 50% of total supply, with average yields of one tonne per 
hectare, though yields of over two tonnes have been achieved, a higher figure than for 
commercial growers. 
An average of 15% of the crop is rejected at the initial collection point and a 
further 40% after payment to growers during grading at the packhouse. 
The growing skills of growers vary and resulting in different cash returns for 
their produce after deductions for input supplies. The average return per plot in 1998 
was Z$900, with annual earning varying from a profit of Z$2,800 per plot to a loss of 
Z$100, based on two crop seasons per year18. the babycom growing cycle is shown as 
figure 2. Farmers noticeably improved outputs and returns in the second season of the 
scheme. 
Future perspectives. 
Hortico intend to further develop the smallholder outgrower scheme in order 
to increase the numbers of growers working with the scheme, the tonnage supplied 
and the numbers of crops grown. The intention will be over the following two years to 
increase the number of growers supplying the company by 180% to 4,600. Over the 
same period the amount ofbabycom supplied from smallholders is projected as 
increasing from 2 tonnes (50% of supply) to 7 tonnes (70% of supply) per week. 
18 Some farmers achieve 3 crops per year based on a 100 day growing cycle. 
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The company have also gradually encouraged a limited number of growers to 
grow mangetout peas, a more complicated crop to grow. Initial results suggested a 
positive result as a pilot project with 100 farmers growing a single crop during the 
winter. Most farmers were achieving an average of22 pickings per crop, again above 
the average achieved on commercial farms. 
Hortico Produce are required by their buyers to ensure safety of the product 
and are generally subjected to the requirements ofHACCP 19 guidelines. These 
guidelines require proper procedures to be followed and recording systems adopted 
for production, handling and transport of the crop before delivery to the buyer. 
As the smallholder scheme develops Hortico intend to update and implement a 
programme ofHACCP ofrelevance to smallholder growers. The company are also 
eager to develop codes of practice for the horticultural sector which ensures proper 
trading practices to be adopted between buyers and smallholder growers and also 
encourages greater adoption and encouragement of these schemes. 
The company also anticipates increasing the numbers of regional centres in 
line with the anticipated increases in the numbers of smallholder growers. The 
company estimate that a minimum number of 50 growers are required in order that a 
regional centre may be established. 
In order to build upon the current infrastructure developed primarily through the 
expansion of the babycom scheme and to develop mangetout production, the 
company intend to further invest in a programme of expansion. This would include 
purchase of trucks, motor vehicles, bicycles, computers, weighing equipment and 
knapsack sprayers. 
Post harvest handling of crop is a particular focus for the future in order to 
ensure better handling and reduced losses, particularly from crop dehydration. The 
installation of evaporative coolers at collection points is anticipated. 
Hortico are also interested in further developing appropriate technologies 
which would enable smallholders to improve yields and qualities from their plots. In 
particular technologies to enable improvements to be made in water, chemical and 
fertiliser applications. The company intend to work with a number of aid programmes 
in order to improve these areas. 
19 Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points. 
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Appendix 2 
Harare Workshop Report 
The further development of smallholder out-grower schemes in 
Zimbabwe 
Background. 
On Thursday 29th September 1998, a workshop was held at the offices of CARE 
International in Harare, Zimbabwe. This workshop was part of an ongoing DFID 
supported research project focusing upon the provision of agricultural services 
through self-help in Sub-Saharan Africa. Seventeen persons were specifically invited 
to the workshop and included industry representatives (mainly horticultural 
exporters), NGOs and farmer support organisations. The list of participants can be 
found below. 
The workshop followed discussions with the participants individually (as well as with 
a number of other persons) over the preceding 6 months. The main pwpose of the 
meetings had been to appraise the effectiveness of smallholder out-grower schemes 
and to develop recommendations that will assist in their future establishment and 
growth. The pwpose of the workshop was to build further upon these individual 
discussions. 
The workshop particularly focused upon the role of Government, NGOs, research and 
advisory centres, donors, fmancial institutions and industry, in encouraging the 
development of smallholder out-grower schemes. The workshop was facilitated by 
John Millns (Plunkett Foundation) and GeoffBockett (NRI). 
This paper summarises the main issues highlighted and views expressed during the 
workshop. It does not necessarily reflect the views of the authors. This material is to 
be read in the context of the findings of the wider research project. 
The role of Government. 
The general consensus within the group was that trade activities are best managed by 
private commercial entities. It was positively noted that the role of Government in 
agricultural trade activities was gradually being reduced within Zimbabwe. 
However, the group did express the view that Government still had a key role to play 
in the encouragement of smallholder marketing schemes, particularly in relation to: 
• enabling farmers to obtain ownership titles on land; 
• improving banking regulation and promoting sensible bank lending programmes; 
• providing preferential taxation or other financial incentives for commercially 
developed smallholder out-grower schemes; and 
• improving basic communication, road and water infrastructures. 
It was agreed however that smallholder schemes should develop further through 
initiatives established by farmers and commercial companies, regardless of 
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Government action and incentives. These incentives were not anticipated as being 
forthcoming in the immediate future. 
The role ofNGOs. 
Commercial parties expressed the concern that, as the role of Government in 
agricultural trade was reduced, there may be a tendency for NGOs, donor programmes 
and associations to take over activities which were best left to commercial companies 
and market forces. 
It was agreed that NGOs were best able to provide sources of technical know-how and 
information support in order to facilitate and encourage schemes, rather than attempt 
to manage them. NGOs function most effectively in a networking and awareness 
creation role-- see below. 
It was agreed by group members that NGOs could also provide useful support in 
reducing the establishment costs of developing smallholder outgrower schemes, for 
both farmers and commercial companies. In particular this would involve providing 
support for facilitating linkages and contacts between farmers and commercial 
companies and undertaking initial feasibility studies and groundwork. 
NGOs represented at the workshop were in general agreement that marketing issues 
remained a major problem for smallholder farmers and were still not adequately 
addressed in many projects, including those implemented by NGOs. NGOs recognise 
this weakness and have started to take measures to ensure that marketing specialists 
are involved in future projects. 
There was a feeling that many NGO programmes could further facilitate smallholder 
out-grower schemes by supporting the development of appropriate technologies, in 
co-operation with commercial companies, particularly in relation to irrigation, water 
conservation, growing, storage and handling technologies. 
It was generally felt that NGO training support to farmers would be useful, 
particularly if focused upon helping farmers to understand techniques for growing 
higher value, less traditional crops (including export varieties) as well as on farm 
planning and cash management. 
Views were expressed that, at the present time, the Zimbabwean Farmers' Union was 
unable to provide independent services which would help establish commercially-led 
and viable smallholder out-grower schemes and their role was largely politically 
focused. 
Research and advisory services. 
The group, generally felt, that agricultural research and extension agents should be 
further encouraged to develop more commercially directed programmes which could 
link with smallholder out-grower schemes. The consensus was that research based on 
commercial considerations was much more sustainable. 
It was felt that at the present time Agritex (state funded extension service) had neither 
the experience nor the resources enabling them to provide reliable extension services 
to smallholder farmers interested in growing non-traditional crop varieties. 
Commercial companies and NGOs would need to take a lead in this area. 
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Donors. 
A general consensus within the group was that most aid programmes in Zimbabwe 
aiming at improving and strengthening smallholder marketing over the last 30 years 
had been unsuccessful, and that there needed to be honest evaluations of the lessons 
learned. 
The experience of most group members of farmer marketing schemes which had been 
managed through donor programmes in Zimbabwe suggested that the project plans 
and anticipated outputs were generally over optimistic and commercially unrealistic. 
The group felt that many projects had been detrimental to smallholder farmers and 
had fostered a mentality of dependence on donor aid rather than commercial, 
economic and sustainable development. 
The group generally expressed the view that donor programmes should complement 
issues of food security with projects that would stimulate commercial and economic 
development through more creative initiatives and business linkages, involving a wide 
variety of stakeholders. 
The possibility of establishing an independent forum for supporting the establishment 
of more smallholder out-grower schemes was raised. It was recommended that this 
forum would include representatives from commercial companies, farmers, 
Government, donors and NGOs. 
It was also generally accepted that donor programmes should continue to involve 
local institutions in projects as far as possible, so that skills and experiences were 
transferable. 
Financial institutions. 
Within the group there was a general feeling that commercial banks neither 
understood the potential of smallholder out-grower schemes nor their specific 
financial requirements. Poor lending programmes, particularly from the Agricultural 
Finance Company, had also in recent years, helped to reinforce a prejudice against 
these schemes within commercial banks. 
The group expressed a hope that more innovative schemes and imaginative solutions 
would develop which would enable joint risk partnerships, between farmers, banks 
and commercial companies, to be created. 
Subsidised loans for smallholder out-grower schemes, supported by the Government 
or donors, were raised as possibilities, but only on the basis of clear and open 
guidelines. 
Generally it was accepted that fmancial institutions would only become convinced of 
the economic potential of these projects if, truly successful examples were developed 
and smallholder farmers became more able to manage their own money. The view 
was expressed that with inflation presently at 40% the value of any incomes not 
invested by farmers was rapidly reduced throughout a year. 
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Commercial companies. 
The group recognised that the development of any smallholder out-grower scheme 
could not be considered as a short-term possibility for commercial companies. Any 
development would require senior management a strategic decision and commit time 
and money resources for a minimum of 3 years. 
The group felt that the large majority of companies would not make commitments of 
this kind or take the risk of developing a project involving a large number of small 
growers without immediate returns on investments. 
It was also noted that commodity type products, such as cotton and paprika did not 
provide sufficient margins to be made which would enable further developments to 
schemes to be made, even though the main suppliers were smallholder farmers. 
It was noted that successful schemes in Zimbabwe had senior management support 
but also generally required a committed and enthusiastic individual in the company 
who would actually drive the scheme forward and make it work. 
Minimum guaranteed prices were considered as being important assurances for 
farmers, but it was felt that of greater importance was the need for more trust to 
develop between smallholders and commercial companies. 
It was agreed that it was dishonest to persuade smallholder growers to grow crops for 
which there was no clear market opportunity and that companies committing 
themselves to these schemes would need to accept a wider responsibility. This 
responsibility would involve enabling greater empowerment of smallholder farmers 
and support to farm management, growing techniques and crop rotations. 
A final concern expressed within the group was that the current rapid increases in 
prices, particularly for irrigation, electricity and other inputs was likely to make the 
profitability of all kinds of farms and many new projects questionable. 
Participants at workshop 29th September 1998. 
John Millns (Plunkett Foundation), GeoffBockett (NRI)- facilitators. 
A.Garikayi- Coopibo (NGO). 
M.Mutambira- Self Help Development Foundation (NGO). 
P.Lehrmann- Cargills (Commercial company). 
P.Chinogo- Olivine industries (Commercial company). 
A.Tumer -Interfresh (Commercial company). 
O.Mutoko- Olivine industries (Commercial company). 
J.Buttery - Oxfam (NGO). 
S.Musa- Commercial bank of Zimbabwe (Commercial bank). 
D.Nyahondo - Farmers Development Trust (NGO). 
G. Tobaiwa- CARE International (NGO). 
Man-Kwun Chan- NRI (Research and consulting company). 
T.Chivere- The Cotton Company of Zimbabwe (Commercial company). 
M.Manda- Intermediate Technology Development Group (NGO). 
T.Yuba- Horticultural Promotion Council!USAID (Trade association). 
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K.Stevenson - CARE International (NGO). 
G.Evans- Hortico (Commercial company). 
D.Perlman- Hortico (Commercial company). 
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Appendix 3 
The London Workshop 
Enhancing the Development Impact of Export Horticulture in Sub-
Saharan Africa. 
This workshop was organised jointly by NRl and the Trade and Enterprise 
Programme at the Institute for Development Studies. John Humphrey and Catherine 
Dolan of IDS have been researching similar themes on export horticulture from sub-
Saharan Africa. 20 Both teams of researchers wished to promote interaction and debate 
between development practitioners, the private sector, academics and government and 
therefore decided to join forces to present and discuss research findings. 
The one-day workshop was held at the Holiday Inn Victoria in London on 3rd 
February 1999 (see below for full list of participants). The following summaries are 
presented here: 
• Main highlights 
• List of presentations 
• List of participants 
20 The lDS group is examining the links between African exporters and UK. supermarkets, and is part 
of a broader research programme on private sector development fmanced by ESCOR. 
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ENHANCING THE DEVELOPMENT IMPACT OF EXPORT 
HORTICULTURE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
MAIN HIGHLIGHTS 
Summarising the findings of a full day of discussion involving 60 people is a challenging 
task. A more in-depth treatment can be found in the attached summary of the workshop 
discussion and of the individual speakers' presentations. 
The following main points emerged from the day: 
• Export horticulture is one of Africa's recent success stories. It is very important to 
increase the involvement of smallholders, as this will: (a) spread the benefits more widely 
across the population, and: (b) allow the industry to grow more in the longer term. 
• In the UK trade, there is significant apprehension about sourcing from smallholders in 
Africa, relating mainly to issues of quality, reliability, safety and cost. Exporters also face 
risks including loan default and side selling to other exporters. 
• Notwithstanding these problems, professional and far-sighted operators in both Kenya 
and Zimbabwe have organised highly effective out-grower schemes that have enabled 
smallholders to meet the quality and other requirements of the European trade. 
• Smallholders also offer certain advantages: (a) crop care is frequently better; (b) they 
save costs with labour-intensive crops; (c) larger farmers often face problems of labour 
motivation and management control; (c) small plots enhance continuity of supply through 
geographically dispersed microclimates, pose fewer problems of disease, and allow for 
inter-cropping, which increases protection against wind damage. 
• Smallholder schemes appear to work best when major, established, exporters take on the 
role of "benign dictator", organising smallholders and assuming responsibility for a rigid 
enforcement of standards. 
• The "benign dictator" approach can be valuably complemented by "bottom-up" initiatives 
of the kind promoted by FPEAK in Kenya. Farmers organise into small groups of 15-20 
to obtain information, inputs, technical and quality assistance. In this way they can 
achieve economies of scale and interact more successfully with exporters. Given the poor 
record of larger co-operative type organisations, the focus should be on such small 
primary level groups. 
• Specialised trade associations and NGOs can perform a valuable role in facilitating strong 
and mutually beneficial relationships between smallholders and exporters. 
• A "Paint by Numbers" approach can create unnecessary hurdles for smallholders, and in 
view of this the UK trade should do more to tailor it's quality, ethical and environmental 
monitoring to the reality of smallholder-based systems. This does not mean that 
standards should be relaxed - only that they should be applied in ways that are cost-
effective and manageable for smallholders. 
• Donors and Governments should work in partnership with the trade to reduce the risks 
and costs involved in sourcing from smallholders. The following are priority areas for 
support: the creation of a facilitative policy framework; the development of appropriate 
quality guidelines; support for specialist institutions to facilitate linkages; steps to ease 
critical financing bottlenecks; continued research on the implications of ethical trade 
guidelines for smallholders. 
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Presentations 
Introduction, Jessica Irvine, Business Development Advisor, DFID 
Session 1: Market Requirements in the UK 
John Humphrey, Professorial Fellow, Institute of Development Studies 
John Foley, Head of Buying, Waitrose 
Sudhir Mehta, Financial Director, Minor, Weir and Willis 
Session 11: Experiences in Smallholder Sourcing for the UK Market 
Annabelle Malins, Post Harvest Technologist, Natural Resources Institute 
Graeme Evans, General Manager Hortico Agrisystems, Zimbabwe 
Gary Tomlins, Director of Agronomy, Homegrown, Kenya 
Session Ill: Support for Smallholder Development 
Jonathan Coulter, Principal Economist, Marketing Systems, Natural Resources 
Institute 
John Karugua, Chairman, Fresh Produce Exporters of Kenya and Director, Everest 
Enterprises, Kenya 
Antony Ellman, Consultant agriculturalist, specialised in development of outgrower 
schemes 
Closing Remarks, J essica Irvine, Business Development Advisor, DFID 
Workshop participants 
Ms. Lucy Ambridge, DFID, UK 
Mr. Paul Bashell, Malet Azoulay, UK 
Mr. Clive Bayton, Geest Fresh Produce, UK 
Mr. Nick Bemard, Albert Fisher, UK 
Mr. Bill Blackbum, Mack Multiples, UK 
Mr. Mick Blowfield, NRI, UK 
Mr. Hugh Eduard Campbell, Deciduous Fruit Producers' Trust, South Africa 
Mr. Jim Cheatle, Association for Better Land Husbandry, Kenya 
Mr. Ralph Cant, Mitchell and Mitchell, UK 
Mr. Jonathan Coulter, NRI, UK 
Mr. Derek Cull, Wealmoor, UK 
Mr. Benny Dembitzer, GIC, UK 
Mr. Atul Dhanani, Exotic Farm Produce, UK 
Ms. Claire Dirdal, Safeway , UK 
Dr. Catherine Dolan, lDS, UK 
Mr. Alex Douse, W Baileys Ltd, UK 
Mr. Mark Driver, Minor Weir and Willis, UK 
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Synthesis of Key Findings from Presentations and Discussion 
Introduction 
Horticultural exports have been one of the biggest economic success stories in sub-Saharan 
Africa over the past decade. African countries are main suppliers of off-season fruits and 
vegetables to UK markets due to favourable climatic conditions, geographic proximity to 
European markets, and low-cost labour. The horticultural trade has provided many jobs, not 
only in agricultural production and post-harvest processing, but also in the service and 
logistics activities required to move high-quality, safe products from African farms to 
supermarket shelves. However, one striking feature of the industry has been its reluctance to 
source from self-employed smallholders. In the case of the foremost supplying country, Kenya, 
there were reports of a move away from smallholders in favour of horticultural estates which 
employ wage labour. 
The workshop brought together UK retailers and importers, African exporters and 
representatives of business associations in both Africa and Europe in order to discuss the 
constraints and opportunities facing smallholders in the export horticultural trade. Specific 
attention was awarded to examining the types of support that smallholders would need to 
meet the requirements of the UK supermarkets. 
Market requirements in the UK 
The UK is the most sophisticated food market in Europe. Consumers want convenient, good 
quality food, which is well presented and at a competitive price. UK supermarkets have 
shifted these customer preferences down the supply chain, expanding the type of 
requirements that African suppliers must meet in order to access UK markets. These are 
volume, consistency, reliability, quality and price. Furthermore, supermarkets are under 
increasing pressure to source products that comply with UK food safety regulations and are 
produced under ethically and environmentally sound conditions. Market access is contingent 
upon meeting these standards, which are key factors driving the structure of the industry, 
both in the UK and in Africa. 
These stringent requirements have made retailers more selective about their suppliers, and 
suppliers more discerning about their growers. In particular, retail demands for quality and 
due diligence place considerable organisational burdens on African exporters, who must 
demonstrate traceability of a product from field to supermarket shelf. Horticultural crops 
demand a level of technical and managerial skill that exceeds other agricultural sectors due to 
consumer concerns, the environmental sensitivity of crops and the importance of inputs and 
post-harvest practices for market profitability. Because of this, exporters seek producers who 
can afford appropriate inputs, verify due diligence and ensure quality produce. Increasingly, 
exporters require producers to have management systems that oversee the use of chemicals, 
undertake audits, and develop monitoring procedures. 
These factors pose potential impediments to market entry for smallholders who generally 
lack adequate credit, inputs or technical capabilities. To date, traceability requirements have 
favoured large producers, who having centralised production facilities and consequent 
economies of scale, can economically supervise pesticide application and ensure quality. 
From an exporter's perspective, it is far easier and cheaper to audit and monitor a large 
production unit than dispersed farmers. 
Several other factors have encouraged exporters to source from large producers, including 
the production, logistics and management aspects of supplying overseas markets. At the 
production level, it has been argued that smallholders have difficulty achieving product 
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consistency throughout the season. This is partly due to variation in agronomic practices 
(harvesting, crop rotation and pesticide application) as well as an absence of co-ordinated 
technical services. Specifically, there is concern that smallholders will not use pesticides 
safely, efficiently or in accordance with environmental guidelines. Smallholders also 
suffer from logistical constraints such as transport, haulage, airfreight, and cold storage 
facilities. The costs for logistics are often predicated on economies of scale and larger 
entities are better able to make these investments. Finally, the horticultural supply chain 
relies on the transmission of market and technical information, which is more easily 
communicated to 50 people on one lOO-hectare farm than to 50 people on separate, 
perhaps dispersed, two-hectare farms. Thus, the ever-increasing demands for scale are 
reducing the number of producers to those who can not only provide large quantities of 
products, but also guarantee higher levels of investment into post-harvest processing and 
logistics. 
Can smallholders meet these requirements? 
While scale and volume are increasingly essential for exporters, they are not essential for 
production. There is nothing inherent in smallholder production that prevents UK 
requirements from being met. In fact, smallholders can offer exporters certain advantages. 
Some product lines, such as babycorn and French beans, are particularly competitive for 
smallholder production. Crop care is frequently enhanced and smallholders are better 
equipped to cultivate crops with a high degree of labour intensity. Smallholder production is 
reliant on family labour and hence offers exporters amounts of labour unavailable on large 
commercial farms. Further, small plots facilitate continuity of supply through geographically 
dispersed microclimates, pose fewer problems of disease, and allow for inter-cropping, which 
increases protection against wind damage. Smallholders also enable exporters to overcome 
constraints regarding land availability. 
If smallholders are to capitalise on these advantages, they must overcome the various 
obstacles mentioned and offer UK customers equivalent quality and the same degree of 
confidence about safety as offered by larger producers. But how can this be achieved? For an 
answer we now turn to two successful cases where smallholders have gained access to the UK 
market. 
Effective Smallholder Integration: Case Studies 
Many exporters have been deterred from incorporating smallholders due to the costs and risks 
involved, including the risk that smallholders will not repay cash advances and will side-sell 
produce to alternative market outlets, and the risk UK customers will react negatively to the 
simple fact that they source from smallholders. Yet two of Africa's largest horticultural 
exporters, Hortico (Zimbabwe) and Homegrown (Kenya), have shown that by intensively 
supervising smallholders and assuming responsibility for rigid enforcement of standards, 
exporters can effectively integrate them into supermarket chains. This general approach was 
described as the "benign dictatorship model". 
Hortico 
Five years ago Hortico realised that there was exceptional potential for growth in export 
horticulture that they could not satisfy by sourcing from large commercial farmers, who were 
realising substantial profits through tobacco production. As a result, the company explored the 
possibility of sourcing produce from smallholder farmers to meet rising retail demands. 
Today, Hortico has organised over 3,000 farmers into outgrower schemes comprised of 
farmers who grow horticultural crops on plots as small as 600square metres. Notably, these 
farmers work un-irrigated land using watering-cans. There are 19 service centres staffed by 
Hortico personnel, who co-ordinate the production and harvesting activities of between 50 
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and 250 farmers. 
In order to satisfy their UK customers, Hortico needed to ensure that pesticide use, product 
traceability and post-harvest handling systems equalled those of with their commercial 
outgrowers. They achieved this by working closely with smallholders and closely supervising 
production. Specifically, Hortico provides farmers with training and inputs, and company 
staff carry out all spraying with agrochemicals Hortico identifies the foundation of their 
programme as commitment, good working relationships, based on trust, and well-defined 
roles and responsibilities. 
The developmental success of Hortico 's outgrower scheme is reflected by their near 100% 
recovery of input costs, the involvement of women in the scheme (sixty percent of the 
participating farmers), and the expansion of multiplier effects throughout local communities 
including improved roads, services and employment opportunities. 
Homegrown 
In contrast to Hortico, Homegrown sources produce from smallholder farmers on plots of up 
to 50 hectares. Homegrown also maintains very tight control over smallholders in order to 
supply safe, good quality food to UK customers. In fact, the company's confidence in 
smallholder produce is so great that it encourages UK supermarkets to chose smallholders at 
random for inspection. It also provides high quality seed (not readily available on the 
market), extension services through agronomists and crop protection agents, and loans to 
mitigate fmancial constraints. Key measures include: 
• Strict record-keeping and traceabilty: All monitoring and documentation required of 
Homegrown's large production units are applied to smallholders, who are audited for 
compliance with its code of practice every month. 
• Pesticide use: It provides regular training on correct pesticide measurement and 
application and ensures that chemical stores are inspected and monitored. 
• Facilities: It provides farmers with grading facilities as well as a charcoal cooler to 
ensure temperature-controlled conditions throughout the supply chain. 
Like Hortico, this smallholder scheme is responsible for spreading the benefits of the 
horticultural trade throughout the rural economy. Each year Homegrown pays smallholders an 
average of $1.6 to $1.8 million, which is generating significant knock-on effects in rural 
areas. 
What support is required? 
Homegrown and Hortico clearly demonstrate that smallholders can meet the strict quality 
standards of the UK. market but that support is needed to mitigate financial, technical and 
infrastructural constraints. Key requirements for smallholder success include: 
• logistics and local facilities for product protection and collection 
• technical support such as an agronomist and spray teams 
• management and technical resources to ensure product traceability, documentation and 
reliable records 
• training (ICMS, hygiene, pesticide use, record keeping, etc.) 
• trust and commitment between players in the chain 
These requirements can only be satisfied through the development of linkages and trust 
between exporters and producers. 
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Whilst a strong working relationship between exporters and their smallholder outgrowers is 
the "core requirement" for the healthy development of this industry, there are.other needs 
calling for outside support. The most obvious requirement is that Government provides the 
enabling environment to enhance the competitiveness ofthe sector. This could include 
ensuring maintenance of the infrastructure, research and development into new crop varieties 
etc., and conducive export policies (i.e. reduction in export duties etc.). In many countries, 
the case for such support is very strong, given that horticultural exports are central to 
Governments' foreign exchange and employment goals. 
There is also a case for third-party support to: (a) reduce the risks and costs which 
discourage exporters from working with smallholders, and; (b) address longer-term issues 
and equity considerations which may be beyond the concern of the exporter. Whilst there are 
many advantages to the "benign dictator" model, one may ask what happens if and when the 
dictator leaves? Or, what happens ifhe proves not to be benign?. 
For this reasons there is a valuable role for "bottom-up" initiatives of the kind promoted by 
FPEAK in Kenya, or the "marriage-broker" approach adopted by F AIDA in Tanzania. In 
the case of the FPEAK scheme, farmers organise into small groups of 15-20 to obtain 
information, inputs, technical and quality assistance. They are trained in integrated crop 
management systems, hygiene~ pesticide uses and record keeping, which are key concerns of 
the UK. market. Such primary level organisations can moreover help farmers respond to 
industry changes, and obtain access to finance and an alternative market outlets. 
More experience is needed to substantiate the effectiveness of these groups. However, past 
DFID-funded research indicates that small village groups of this kind often interact 
successfully with agribusiness. By contrast Africa's general experience with larger co-
operative-type organisations at district, regional or national levels has been very poor. 
As the above examples show, both trade associations and non-Governmental organisations 
(NGOs) can provide a range of educational support and facilitate effective linkages between 
smallholders and exporters. However, export horticulture has been private sector driven and 
companies are naturally wary of interference by outsiders, who may moreover lack necessary 
local knowledge. Here it should be recognised that some NGOs already have experience in 
facilitating such linkages, and are well equipped to mobilise farmers, provide training and 
capacity building to farmers' organisations. The important thing to recognise is that NGOs 
vary widely in their outlook towards business, experience and capabilities, and that only 
certain of them have a vocation for this sort ofworlC1• 
African export associations have a role in promoting horticultural activities in general, 
through such activities as developing and promoting all-encompassing codes of conduct and a 
positive brand image of the country's products. Specifically on the smallholder issue, their 
role depends on the needs expressed by the exporters. 
The UK supermarkets define how the chain is structured, what is produced, to what 
standards and by whom. They are, therefore, well placed to communicate market information 
and customer requirements down the chain to African producers. In particular, supermarkets 
need to communicate their support for smallholder integration to their suppliers in the UK. and 
Africa and to ensure that the specification of their requirements does not involve a "painting 
by numbers" approach with inappropriate verification systems. Quality, ethical and 
environmental monitoring procedures should be fully adapted to the realities of smallholder-
based systems and avoid creating unnecessary hurdles. 
21 The fact that the speakers representing both Homegrown and Hortico had initially gained African experience with NGOs 
suggests that they may provide critical experience needed for developing smallholder-based agribusiness manager. The leading 
grain trader in Mozambique also entered the business via this route. 
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International aid donors (and more specifically DFID) can support smallholder 
involvement in the following ways. 
• By supporting the development of quality guidelines that will enable exporters sourcing 
from smallholders to meet the requirements of the 1990 UK Food Safety Act. Guidelines 
need to be fully adapted to African realities. 
• By building up a cadre of highly skilled "facilitators" to assist in developing linkages 
between smallholder farmers and exporters in Africa. 
• By considering the case for support for venture capital funds and/or loan guarantee funds, 
with a view to overcoming financial bottlenecks. Zimbabwean participants mentioned the 
conservatism of local banks as an important constraint on the development of smallholder 
based schemes. Very weak local banking sectors are a problem in various countries of 
Southern Africa. However, it is stressed that before setting up a new fund, one should 
first determine whether a better use of existing funding agencies could solve the problem. 
• To continue researching the implications of ethical trade guidelines for smallholders, in 
close consultation with supplying country stakeholders. Great care should be exercised to 
ensure that such guidelines do not inadvertently lead to the exclusion of smallholders, on 
the grounds of using family labour or other criteria. 
• To provide other ad hoc support to help the African trade to overcome important 
constraints preventing the development of smallholder-based horticulture. This might for 
example involve training support or helping Governments build penetration roads in areas 
seeking to develop horticultural exports. 
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